Asari Dokubo's latest outburst over Niger Delta pipeline-security contracts looks, at first glance, like another quarrel between former militants.
It is not.
It is a window into one of the strangest arrangements in Nigeria's political economy:
The Nigerian state once fought these men as militants. It then granted them amnesty. It subsequently paid some of them to protect the same oil infrastructure they once disrupted. And today, those former combatants are fighting one another over who gets to protect the pipelines.
That is the deeper story.
The immediate controversy began after Joel Omosere Agho, popularly known as Mr Common Sense, challenged former Niger Delta militants including Government Ekpemupolo, popularly known as Tompolo, and Asari Dokubo.
His question was brutally simple:
You said you were fighting for the Niger Delta. You got amnesty. You gained political access. You became wealthy. You now receive enormous government contracts to protect oil infrastructure. So why is the Niger Delta still so poor, environmentally damaged and underdeveloped?
Instead of answering that question directly, Asari counterattacked.
He pointed to the Olu of Warri and Osahon Okunbo.
He alleged that they were receiving ₦2.7 trillion annually for pipeline protection.
He asked why nobody was criticising them.
And then the argument became ethnic.
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But there is something fascinating about Asari's ₦2.7tn claim
The claim is now being reported by multiple Nigerian media organisations.
On October 5, 2026, Asari said the Olu of Warri and Osahon — apparently referring to Osahon Okunbo, an executive of Pipeline Infrastructure Nigeria Limited (PINL) and son of the late Captain Hosa Okunbo — were collecting about ₦2.7 trillion annually for pipeline protection.
But there is an enormous problem.
No publicly available contract document found in this research establishes a ₦2.7 trillion annual payment.
And that matters enormously.
At ₦2.7 trillion per year, the alleged payment works out to:
₦225 billion every month
₦7.4 billion every day
about ₦309 million every hour
about ₦5.15 million every minute
That is an extraordinary amount of money for pipeline surveillance.
It would also be more than 56 times the widely reported original annual value of Tompolo's ₦4 billion-per-month Tantita contract.
The original Tantita arrangement was reported at approximately ₦48 billion annually.
So the question is not simply whether Asari is right.
The question is:
> Where is the ₦2.7 trillion contract?
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And there is an even more interesting historical figure: ₦138 billion
The ₦2.7 trillion claim did not emerge from nowhere.
There has been a long-running dispute over the value and scope of PINL-related pipeline surveillance.
In September 2022, Itsekiri representatives strongly rejected reports linking the Olu of Warri to PINL and specifically disputed reports that the arrangement was worth ₦138 billion annually.
They said the Olu was neither a registered director nor shareholder of PINL, although they acknowledged that he had a business interest.
This is crucial because the public record contains several different descriptions of the corporate relationship.
In 2022:
some reports described the Olu as connected to PINL;
his representatives denied that he owned the company;
Itsekiri stakeholders later acknowledged that he had an interest;
later reports continued to associate him with the company;
and Osahon Okunbo is publicly identified as an executive of PINL.
So even before Asari's latest allegation, the ownership and contract structure was not particularly transparent to the public.
That is precisely why government disclosure matters.
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Who actually received the original contracts?
This is where the story becomes much more interesting.
When NNPC announced the 2022 pipeline-surveillance arrangements, three companies repeatedly appeared in reporting:
Tantita Security Services Nigeria Limited
Associated with Tompolo.
Maton Engineering Nigeria Limited
Associated in contemporary reporting with Mathew Tonlagha, described as a Tompolo ally.
Pipeline Infrastructure Nigeria Limited
Associated with the Trans-Niger/eastern corridor and later strongly linked in public debate to the Olu of Warri's business interests. The Olu's representatives have disputed the description of him as owner.
This means that the story was never simply:
> “Tompolo got a contract.”
It was actually the creation of a network of private indigenous contractors performing state-security functions around critical national oil infrastructure.
And that distinction is important.
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Tompolo's ₦4bn monthly contract was real
This part is much better documented.
In 2022, NNPC awarded Tantita a pipeline surveillance contract reported at approximately ₦4 billion per month, covering Delta, Ondo, Imo, Rivers and parts of Bayelsa.
The Senate subsequently backed the arrangement.
By 2025, reporting described a renewed Tantita contract worth approximately $144 million annually, covering pipeline surveillance, coastal protection and critical infrastructure.
So when critics say Tompolo has become enormously wealthy from government security contracts, that criticism is not based on an imaginary contract.
There really is a large government-backed security business associated with him.
But there is an important counterargument.
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Tantita appears to have delivered results
This is where a fair investigation cannot simply become an attack on Tompolo.
NNPC says national crude production rose from approximately 960,000 barrels per day in 2022 to an average 1.71 million barrels per day, with a peak of 1.84 million barrels per day in 2025.
NNPC explicitly attributed part of this recovery to its integrated pipeline-security system.
The National Assembly also backed the continuation of Tantita in April 2026.
More than 300 federal lawmakers reportedly endorsed the arrangement after a parliamentary review, saying the evidence presented showed increased crude production and reduced pipeline vandalism.
Reuters reported in 2025 that NNPC said pipeline theft had been dramatically reduced and that crude deliveries to export terminals were approaching full volumes.
That means there is a legitimate economic argument for the contracts.
If paying a contractor ₦48 billion a year helps recover billions of dollars in lost crude revenue, the expenditure may actually represent good economics.
The question therefore isn't:
“Why is Tompolo being paid?”
The better question is:
“How much is Nigeria paying everybody, and what measurable value is each contractor delivering?”
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This is where the ₦2.7tn claim becomes explosive
Because if Asari's figure is correct, it fundamentally changes the economics of the entire system.
Suppose Tompolo's widely reported contract is approximately ₦48 billion annually.
Then ₦2.7 trillion is:
56.25 times larger.
That cannot simply be dismissed as a small accounting difference.
It would suggest either:
1. Asari has dramatically misunderstood the contract value;
2. the ₦2.7 trillion includes several contracts or categories of expenditure;
3. the figure includes a much wider security/infrastructure arrangement;
4. the figure refers to contract value rather than actual payments;
5. the figure is wrong;
6. or there is a gigantic category of petroleum-security expenditure that Nigerians have not been properly shown.
Those possibilities need to be separated.
And NNPC is the institution capable of doing that.
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The timing is extraordinary
Asari's allegation came just as another major transparency controversy erupted.
On October 4, former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar demanded disclosure of NNPC's ₦11.2 trillion in Federation-related receivables recorded in its 2025 accounts.
He specifically asked NNPC to explain pipeline-security expenditure:
What was paid? Who was paid? For what work? Where are the results?
That means the Asari controversy has landed inside a much bigger national argument.
This isn't just an ethnic dispute anymore.
It is becoming an NNPC transparency question.
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Nigeria has already spent hundreds of billions fighting pipeline theft
There is another figure that deserves attention.
Reporting based on NNPC financial information has put pipeline-security expenditure at approximately ₦267.98 billion over a 16-month period, an average of roughly ₦16 billion per month.
That number does not automatically disprove Asari.
Different contracts can exist.
Different years can contain different arrangements.
And total security expenditure can include the military, surveillance, intelligence, logistics and other services.
But it demonstrates why the government should publish a proper breakdown.
Because Nigerians should not have to reconstruct the country's oil-security expenditure from newspaper reports and statements by rival contractors.
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The irony: Asari himself once received pipeline contracts
This is perhaps the most important fact missing from most versions of the current controversy.
Asari is not merely defending the principle that Niger Delta people should benefit from oil-security contracts.
He was himself a beneficiary of that model.
In 2015, NNPC announced the renewal and extension of pipeline-protection contracts involving former Niger Delta militants.
The beneficiaries included:
Government Ekpemupolo;
Mujahid Asari-Dokubo;
Bipobiri Ajube, known as General Shoot-at-Sight.
The contracts were expanded beyond the original areas into other parts of the country.
And in June 2015, Asari publicly complained that the Federal Government owed him and other contractors money for pipeline surveillance work.
He specifically said that the contracts had not been paid after the previous administration left office.
That changes the interpretation of his current argument.
He isn't merely saying:
> “Why should Tompolo get paid?”
He is saying:
> “Why should Tompolo get paid while other Niger Delta interests are excluded?”
That is a fundamentally different argument.
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And Asari once made almost exactly the same complaint about Tompolo
This is the most remarkable part of the story.
In September 2022, when Tompolo received the widely reported ₦4 billion monthly contract, Asari himself attacked the arrangement.
He complained that Tompolo was taking pipeline surveillance work across territories belonging to other Niger Delta ethnic groups.
He specifically objected to Tompolo's involvement in the 83-kilometre pipeline running through Kalabari territory.
He accused Tompolo of taking contracts covering multiple communities rather than allowing local interests to participate.
So there is a striking continuity.
In 2022, Asari's complaint was essentially:
> Why is Tompolo taking everybody's pipeline contract?
In 2026, Asari's complaint is:
> Why are people criticising Tompolo when other people are also getting pipeline contracts?
The underlying principle is actually consistent:
Asari believes pipeline-security opportunities should be distributed among Niger Delta interests rather than concentrated in one contractor.
But it also exposes the weakness in the argument.
Because if the real objective is development, the answer cannot simply be:
> “Give more contracts to more Niger Delta elites.”
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The Niger Delta could simply create more millionaires without creating development
This is the heart of Omosere's challenge.
Imagine Nigeria changes the system tomorrow.
Instead of Tompolo receiving one large contract:
Tompolo gets Delta;
Asari gets Rivers;
the Olu-linked company gets another corridor;
another ex-militant gets Bayelsa;
another traditional institution gets Ondo;
another businessman gets another pipeline;
local chiefs get community contracts.
Everyone becomes richer.
But what happens to the communities?
That is the question.
Because contract distribution is not the same thing as development.
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The original Niger Delta struggle was never supposed to be about contracts
This is historically important.
The Nigerian state itself recognised in the 2009 Amnesty proclamation that the Niger Delta conflict involved a broader problem of peace, security, stability and development.
President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua's proclamation explicitly linked the amnesty to the need to create conditions for the region's socio-economic development.
The World Bank later described the post-2009 arrangement as involving amnesty, disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration.
But it also made an extraordinarily important observation:
Little had fundamentally changed in addressing some of the underlying drivers of the conflict — including youth unemployment, environmental degradation, transparency in revenue flows and the toxic environmental legacy of oil exploration.
That is almost exactly the question Omosere is asking today.
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The Amnesty programme itself became an economic ecosystem
This is another uncomfortable part of the story.
The Presidential Amnesty Programme was intended to reintegrate former combatants.
The programme says weapons from more than 29,000 ex-militants were recovered and that beneficiaries were to be trained and reintegrated into productive economic life.
But the programme has also attracted criticism over its cost and structure.
A study cited by BusinessDay noted allegations that approximately 80% of some rehabilitation budgets went to consultants and contractors, rather than directly to rehabilitation of former militants.
Whether every historical percentage is still applicable today is another question.
But the broader pattern is undeniable:
Nigeria repeatedly responds to Niger Delta instability by creating programmes, contracts, allowances and institutions around the conflict.
The danger is that the conflict itself becomes economically valuable to the people positioned closest to government money.
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And the system is still growing
The 2026 budget allocated approximately ₦115 billion to the Presidential Amnesty Programme, according to budget documents reported by Punch.
That was a dramatic increase from ₦65 billion in 2024 and 2025.
So sixteen years after the 2009 amnesty, Nigeria is still spending enormous sums on the political and economic management of the Niger Delta conflict.
This should provoke a serious national question:
> At what point does a peace programme become a permanent political economy?
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Now look at PINL from the other side
It would also be unfair to portray PINL simply as another politically connected contractor.
The company says it operates the Trans-Niger Pipeline and provides engineering, construction, maintenance and security services.
Osahon Okunbo has publicly described a substantial operation:
more than 30 operating camps and drone stations;
more than 40 security vessels;
real-time surveillance;
more than 250 host communities;
thousands of jobs;
women's business-support programmes;
scholarship programmes.
These are company claims, not independently audited figures, but they show that the contractor's argument is not simply “pay us because we are Niger Deltans.”
Its pitch is increasingly:
> We are providing a professional security and community-management service.
That is exactly how the industry should be judged.
Not by ethnicity.
Not by who fought whom.
Not by who was once a militant.
But by measurable performance.
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There is also evidence that PINL's corridor has improved
PINL has reported zero infractions along sections of the Trans-Niger Pipeline and has promoted a community-engagement model.
The Federal Government has also highlighted improved pipeline integrity and rising oil output.
But again, caution is necessary.
Correlation is not causation.
Nigeria's production recovery has involved:
NNPC;
NUPRC;
the military;
intelligence agencies;
private contractors;
oil companies;
community surveillance;
technology;
improved export-terminal operations;
reduced theft.
It would be intellectually dishonest to say:
> “Tantita alone increased Nigerian production.”
Equally, it would be dishonest to say:
> “Private contractors have done nothing.”
The available evidence suggests the private-security model has contributed to the improvement.
The remaining question is whether Nigeria is paying a competitive and transparent price for that improvement.
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The environmental question is even harder
This is where Omosere's argument becomes most powerful.
Because Nigeria can prove that oil production has increased.
It can prove that pipeline security has improved.
It can prove that crude theft has fallen.
It can prove that former militants have received contracts.
But can it prove that the ordinary residents of oil-producing communities are substantially better off?
That is a different metric.
The Niger Delta still suffers from environmental degradation and disputes over compensation and remediation.
The World Bank has repeatedly documented the region's relationship between poverty, environmental degradation and perceived unfair distribution of oil benefits.
And the problems are not merely historical.
An Associated Press investigation into the Ogoni cleanup programme found serious failures involving contractors, laboratories, audits and remediation, despite substantial funding.
So the fundamental contradiction remains:
Nigeria is getting better at protecting oil infrastructure than it has been at fixing the communities surrounding that infrastructure.
That is a damning distinction.
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And this is where ethnicity becomes a distraction
Asari's argument about Ijaw ownership contains a legitimate grievance.
Why should people from outside the region become extremely wealthy from protecting resources located in the Niger Delta while Niger Delta communities remain poor?
That question is legitimate.
But the same logic can be dangerous if taken too far.
Because the Niger Delta is not an Ijaw-only territory.
It includes:
Ijaw;
Itsekiri;
Urhobo;
Isoko;
Ogoni;
Kalabari;
Ibibio;
Andoni;
Nembe;
Efik;
and others.
Oil infrastructure crosses these territories.
If the solution becomes:
> “Our ethnic group must get the contract.”
Nigeria has learned nothing.
It has simply transformed the old patronage system into ethnic patronage.
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And there is evidence that contract competition is already producing tension
In 2025, Sunday PUNCH reported serious tensions among former militants over pipeline contracts involving Tantita and a company in which the Olu of Warri was said to have an interest.
The dispute was not simply philosophical.
There were concerns that competition among ex-militants could contribute to violence and attacks on pipelines.
That is the nightmare scenario.
The government creates a contract to maintain peace.
Then the competition for the contract becomes a source of insecurity.
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So who is actually winning?
There are at least five groups in this ecosystem.
1. The Federal Government
It gets oil production and relative peace.
2. NNPC and the petroleum sector
They get functioning pipelines and improved evacuation.
3. Security contractors
They get enormous commercial opportunities.
4. Former militants
They convert wartime influence into legitimate business and political capital.
5. Host communities
They are supposed to receive jobs, development and stability.
But the fifth group is the one that deserves the most scrutiny.
Because if the first four are becoming richer and more powerful while the fifth remains poor, polluted and unemployed, then the system has reproduced the original Niger Delta problem under a different name.
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This is why Omosere's question is stronger than Asari's counterattack
Asari asks:
> Why are you attacking Tompolo when others are earning more?
Omosere asks:
> Why did the struggle happen in the first place, and what has changed for the people?
Those are not equivalent questions.
One is about distribution of contracts among elites.
The other is about whether the political struggle achieved its stated objective.
The second question is much harder to escape.
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But Asari has a legitimate question of his own
It would be wrong to dismiss him entirely.
He is essentially demanding:
> If Tompolo's contract is controversial, why isn't every other contractor subjected to the same scrutiny?
That is fair.
If NNPC is paying PINL billions:
Publish it.
If NNPC is paying Tantita:
Publish it.
If Maton is being paid:
Publish it.
If another company is receiving money:
Publish it.
If Arthur Eze has a contract:
Publish it.
If Orji Kalu owns a vessel involved in petroleum-security operations:
Publish the registration and contract.
And if none of those allegations are true:
Publish the records and kill the rumours.
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The government can end this controversy in one afternoon
NNPC does not need another press release saying pipeline security has improved.
It needs to publish a table.
Something like:
Contractor Contract value Duration Corridor Payments made Performance
Tantita ? ? ? ? ?
PINL ? ? ? ? ?
Maton ? ? ? ? ?
Others ? ? ? ? ?
Then publish:
beneficial owners;
directors;
subcontractors;
procurement method;
payment schedule;
kilometres covered;
number of personnel;
number of incidents;
crude losses before contract;
crude losses after contract;
community-development obligations;
penalties for failure;
independent audits.
That would destroy 90% of the political argument overnight.
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The ₦2.7tn allegation should therefore be investigated — not repeated as fact
This is the most important editorial distinction.
There is currently enough evidence to say:
Asari Dokubo alleged that interests associated with the Olu of Warri and Osahon Okunbo receive ₦2.7 trillion annually for pipeline protection.
There is not enough public evidence currently available to say that they actually receive ₦2.7 trillion annually.
There are documented pipeline-security contracts involving Tantita, PINL and Maton.
There are documented disputes over the scope, ownership and distribution of those contracts.
There are documented concerns about procurement and transparency.
There is documented evidence that the pipeline-security model has coincided with significant improvements in oil production and reductions in vandalism.
And there is documented evidence that Niger Delta communities continue to face environmental and development problems.
Those are the facts.
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But perhaps the biggest irony is this
The men who once fought the Nigerian state because they believed the state had failed the Niger Delta have now become some of the state's most important partners in securing the oil infrastructure.
That is not necessarily a betrayal.
Former militants becoming legitimate businessmen can actually be one of the great successes of a peace process.
The problem begins when the peace economy becomes more successful than the development economy.
If a former militant can become a billionaire protecting an oil pipeline while the farmer beside that pipeline cannot drink his groundwater...
If a company can earn billions protecting crude while the fishing community beside the crude export route has lost its livelihood...
If government can find billions for security contractors but struggles to fund schools, hospitals and environmental remediation...
Then the original grievance has not really disappeared.
It has merely been commercialised.
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The real question Asari should answer
Asari says he fought.
He says he was arrested.
He says he sacrificed.
The historical record confirms that he was arrested and prosecuted for treasonable felony-related charges in 2005. The Supreme Court record documents the charges against him and his involvement with the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force.
In 2014, he himself said he had been arrested 73 times.
That history deserves recognition.
But sacrifice creates a responsibility.
So perhaps the question should not be:
> “Why are you attacking me?”
It should be:
“After everything we fought for, what should the Niger Delta look like in 2026?”
That is a question worth asking Tompolo.
It is worth asking Asari.
It is worth asking the Olu of Warri.
It is worth asking Osahon Okunbo.
It is worth asking the NDDC.
It is worth asking the Presidential Amnesty Programme.
It is worth asking NNPC.
And it is worth asking the Federal Government.
Because the Niger Delta did not go to war so that a handful of powerful men could win pipeline contracts.
It went to war because millions of people believed the oil beneath their feet should translate into a better life above it.
Sixteen years after the amnesty, that promise remains unfinished.
And perhaps that is why Omosere's question has struck such a nerve.
He did not ask who is collecting the bigger contract.
He asked whether the struggle produced the society its leaders once promised to build.
And nobody can answer that question by pointing at somebody else's bank account.
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