Nigeria has confronted this question before. Long before the present debate over state police, the country operated a national police force alongside regional and local police organisations. That arrangement was abandoned in 1966 after years of political controversy, institutional abuse and inadequate funding.
The historical experience offers a warning that contemporary policymakers should not ignore: decentralising police authority does not guarantee better security, and placing police power closer to political leaders can make the abuse of that power more difficult to control.
Nigeria's current security challenges are serious. Kidnapping, terrorism, banditry, communal violence and organised crime demand urgent action. But the country must distinguish between reforming an ineffective institution and creating additional institutions that may inherit its weaknesses.
The central question is whether Nigeria should rebuild the capacity and accountability of its existing Nigeria Police Force or introduce a dual system that risks repeating the political failures of the First Republic.
The historical record: Nigeria has operated regional police before
Nigeria's policing history began under colonial rule, when police organisations were developed partly to maintain administrative control and protect the interests of the colonial state.
The creation of the Nigeria Police Force in 1930 brought earlier northern and southern police organisations together under a national structure. Regional and local police arrangements nevertheless continued alongside the national force, including Native Authority Police in Northern Nigeria and local government police in Western Nigeria.
These local organisations were not simply neutral community-safety institutions. They operated within political and administrative systems in which regional governments, traditional authorities and local political elites exercised substantial influence.
The problem was structural. The same authorities that benefited from maintaining political control could also influence institutions empowered to enforce the law.
This created an inherent conflict between impartial policing and the interests of those who controlled local political power.
When a police organisation depends heavily on a political authority for appointments, funding and operational direction, its independence can become vulnerable precisely when impartial enforcement matters most.
Nigeria's experience demonstrates that proximity to local government is not sufficient to guarantee accountability. In some circumstances, it can bring law enforcement closer to the political interests it is supposed to regulate.
## The First Republic: When policing became entangled in political conflict
The period between independence in 1960 and the military takeover of January 1966 provides some of the clearest historical reasons for caution.
Nigeria's First Republic was characterised by intense competition between political parties and regional power blocs. Control over government institutions became an important component of political competition, and policing was not insulated from those struggles.
A scholarly chapter published by Oxford University Press documents how regional and local political elites used policing institutions for political purposes. It describes the involvement of police in voter intimidation, harassment of political opponents and electoral manipulation during the First Republic.
Research published in 2026 in *Federalism* also recounts the political controversies surrounding policing during this period, including the Western Region's 1962 political crisis and allegations of police interference in regional political disputes. It also examines abuses associated with Native Authority policing in Northern Nigeria.
These experiences matter because they challenge a central assumption behind state police: that transferring control from the federal government to a state government necessarily makes policing more democratic.
It does not.
A police institution can be local and still be authoritarian. It can understand the language, customs and political relationships of a community while being used against sections of that same community.
The relevant question is not simply who controls the police, but whether that authority can be exercised independently, lawfully and without partisan interference.
Why the regional system was abandoned in 1966
Nigeria's regional and local police arrangements were discontinued during the military transition of 1966. The Dataphyte Foundation's June 2026 analysis identifies inadequate funding and abuses by traditional institutions and political officeholders among the reasons local police forces were dissolved.
This history should be interpreted carefully. The end of regional policing occurred amid a broader political and constitutional breakdown, and it would be misleading to attribute the collapse of the First Republic to regional police alone.
Nevertheless, the documented problems with local police remain directly relevant to the current debate.
The earlier system struggled with the combination of political interference, uneven resources and weak safeguards. Those are precisely the risks that any contemporary proposal for state police must demonstrate it can overcome.
The lesson is not that every decentralised police model must fail. It is that Nigeria has already experienced the dangers of policing structures whose independence and financial sustainability were insufficiently protected.
A major constitutional reform should explain how the proposed arrangement will avoid repeating those failures rather than assume that the passage of time has removed the underlying risks.
The fundamental problem with state police is the concentration of power
Under the proposed model, state governments would establish and administer their own police services alongside the federal police. The constitutional amendment approved by the National Assembly in June 2026 provides for a dual-policing structure, subject to the remaining constitutional approval process.
This would create a new relationship between governors and the institutions empowered to arrest, investigate and enforce the law.
The concern is particularly significant in states where independent institutions already struggle to operate without executive pressure.
The Dataphyte Foundation's 2026 analysis identifies executive influence over appointments, weak legislative oversight and vulnerabilities in judicial independence as factors that could undermine the accountability of state police. It warns that these conditions could allow police powers to be used against political opponents, journalists and civil society.
The issue is not whether every governor would abuse the power. The issue is whether the system would contain sufficiently strong safeguards when a governor attempts to do so.
Consider a state approaching an election. A protest develops against the incumbent administration. Opposition candidates allege intimidation. A journalist investigates allegations involving a powerful political figure.
If the governor exercises substantial influence over the police leadership, the credibility of any investigation into those allegations may be questioned. Even where the officers act lawfully, the appearance of political control can undermine public confidence.
If they act unlawfully, the same political influence could make accountability more difficult.
A national police structure also faces political interference, but dividing police authority among 36 state governments does not automatically eliminate that risk. It creates additional points at which political power can influence law enforcement.
Nigeria should not introduce a new system of coercive authority without first establishing how its independence will be protected in practice.
The financial problem: who will pay for 36 additional police services?
State police would require substantial and recurring expenditure.
Every state would need to finance personnel, training, vehicles, fuel, communications, stations, information systems, investigations, equipment, pensions and disciplinary oversight. These expenses would continue regardless of changes in political leadership or fluctuations in government revenue.
The fiscal challenge is especially important in Nigeria, where many states depend heavily on allocations from the Federation Account.
The Dataphyte Foundation's analysis reports that 23 of Nigeria's 36 states generate less than 20 per cent of their operating expenditure through internally generated revenue. It identifies substantial differences in the ability of states to finance an additional, labour-intensive public service.
This creates two risks.
First, states with weak revenue bases may struggle to sustain their police services, potentially resulting in inadequate equipment, poor welfare and inconsistent training.
Second, substantial additional expenditure on policing could place pressure on education, healthcare, infrastructure and other essential public services.
Federal grants could help address the funding gap, but they would introduce further questions about allocation criteria, political influence and accountability for expenditure.
A state police service that depends on irregular federal assistance may not enjoy the financial independence its proponents anticipate. A service financed through discretionary political arrangements could also become vulnerable to patronage.
The historical experience with regional and local police makes this more than an accounting concern. Financial weakness can undermine operational independence and professional standards.
Nigeria needs a clear, independently assessed funding model before it creates additional institutions with permanent financial obligations.
National policing is essential for crimes that cross state boundaries
Nigeria's security threats are not confined to individual states.
Kidnapping networks can operate across several jurisdictions. Terrorist groups move between territories. Organised criminal organisations can exploit differences in enforcement capacity, while cybercrime and financial offences often involve victims, suspects and evidence spread across the country.
A national police institution provides a common framework for coordinating investigations, sharing intelligence and maintaining consistent standards.
A dual system could retain those advantages, but only if the federal and state forces have clearly defined responsibilities, interoperable databases and enforceable cooperation requirements.
Without those arrangements, jurisdictional disputes could delay investigations or allow criminal suspects to exploit gaps between institutions.
Nigeria would need to establish who leads joint investigations, which authority controls evidence, how officers pursue suspects across state boundaries and how disagreements between federal and state commands are resolved.
These are manageable questions in principle, but they require detailed institutional design and reliable enforcement.
Creating another police organisation before establishing those arrangements could complicate the security environment rather than simplify it.
Why one national police force remains a viable foundation for reform
The argument for retaining a single national police force should not be confused with defending every aspect of the existing system.
Nigeria's centralised police structure has serious weaknesses, including bureaucratic delays, insufficient operational capacity, public distrust and documented concerns about accountability. Academic research published in 2026 examines how centralised authority, militarised practices, corruption and political manipulation have contributed to the institution's difficulties.
These weaknesses demand reform.
However, a national force provides an institutional foundation for common recruitment standards, professional training, national intelligence coordination and consistent rules governing the use of police powers.
It also avoids the immediate need to establish and finance 36 separate police bureaucracies.
The objective should be to preserve those national advantages while addressing the excessive concentration of operational decision-making in Abuja.
That requires a more sophisticated approach than simply maintaining the status quo.
What meaningful reform of the central police should involve
First, decentralise operational decisions without immediately creating separate police institutions.
Local commands should have clearly defined authority to respond to emergencies, allocate personnel and work with communities within national operational standards. Decisions that can safely be made at divisional or state-command level should not be delayed unnecessarily by distant approval procedures.
Second, strengthen local intelligence and community policing.
Police officers need sustained relationships with the communities they serve. Structured engagement with local authorities, community organisations and residents can improve intelligence gathering while preserving a unified national command framework.
The United Nations Development Programme's work with the Nigeria Police Force and civil society partners under the Supporting Police Accountability and Transformation programme has focused on police readiness, welfare, professional standards and accountability. Such initiatives provide a basis for strengthening the existing institution rather than assuming that a new one is indispensable.
Third, improve funding and accountability.
Police budgets should be linked to operational needs, with independent audits of procurement, equipment and expenditure. Personnel must receive adequate training and welfare support, and the public should be able to assess whether increased funding produces measurable improvements in security.
Fourth, strengthen independent oversight.
Complaints of extortion, unlawful detention, torture, excessive force and other misconduct must be investigated credibly. Disciplinary procedures should be transparent, and criminal allegations should be referred to the appropriate independent investigative and prosecutorial authorities.
Fifth, invest in modern investigations.
Forensic laboratories, digital evidence systems, communications equipment and properly maintained criminal databases can improve case resolution. The effectiveness of policing depends not simply on the number of officers but on their ability to investigate offences and build cases that can withstand judicial scrutiny.
Sixth, establish measurable performance standards.
Police commands should be assessed through response times, case-clearance rates, successful prosecutions, complaint outcomes and public confidence. These indicators would help determine whether decentralised operational authority is producing meaningful improvements.
**Finally, protect national coordination.**
The federal police should retain the capacity to coordinate interstate investigations, support operations against organised criminal networks and maintain national intelligence systems. Local responsiveness and national coordination are complementary requirements, not mutually exclusive choices.
Conclusion: Nigeria must learn from its own history
Nigeria's experience with regional and local police demonstrates that decentralisation is not automatically a solution to ineffective policing.
During the First Republic, regional and local police organisations operated within political systems that exposed them to partisan influence, unequal resources and accountability problems. The system was discontinued in 1966, although its abolition occurred amid a much wider constitutional and political crisis.
The contemporary proposal for state police must therefore confront the historical record directly.
The question is not whether local policing has potential benefits. It does. The question is whether Nigeria can establish independent, adequately funded and professionally managed police services across 36 states without reproducing the institutional weaknesses that undermined earlier arrangements.
A single national police force, reformed to give local commands greater operational authority, strengthen community policing and improve accountability, offers a way to pursue local responsiveness while retaining national coordination and common standards.
Such a model would not be effective automatically. It would require political commitment, adequate funding, independent oversight and measurable performance improvements. But it would allow Nigeria to address many of its current policing problems without immediately multiplying police institutions and their associated financial and political risks.
Nigeria should learn from its history rather than repeat its unresolved institutional experiments. The priority must be to make policing more professional, accountable and responsive—not simply to create more centres of police power.
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