In July 2023, President Bola Tinubu announced a ₦100 billion plan to acquire 3,000 compressed natural gas buses. Months later, senators were demanding details of the money and the procurement process. The government subsequently unveiled buses under several related initiatives. The unanswered question is whether the original promise was delivered as announced — and whether the public can trace the money to the vehicles.
Nigeria’s subsidy-removal crisis created an obvious need for affordable public transportation. Petrol prices rose sharply after the government ended the subsidy in May 2023, increasing pressure on commuters, commercial drivers and households already struggling with living costs.
The Tinubu administration presented compressed natural gas (CNG) as part of the answer. If buses could run on cheaper fuel, the government argued, transport operators could reduce their operating costs and eventually offer passengers more affordable fares.
On paper, the plan made sense. The controversy is what happened after the announcement.
In July 2023, Tinubu said the Federal Government would invest ₦100 billion between then and March 2024 to acquire 3,000 CNG-powered buses, each with a capacity of 20 passengers. The buses were supposed to be distributed to major transport companies across the states, with participating companies able to access credit at 9 per cent interest over 60 months.
That was a measurable commitment: a sum of money, a quantity of buses and a delivery window.
More than three years later, Nigerians should be able to examine the original contract, the amounts actually released, the suppliers paid, the vehicles delivered and the locations where those vehicles operate.
Yet the public record available for this investigation does not provide a complete, independently reconciled account of the original ₦100 billion commitment.
That is the accountability problem behind the phrase “ghost buses”.
It is important, however, to distinguish an incomplete public audit trail from proof that the money was stolen or that every bus in the wider programme is fictitious. The evidence reviewed establishes serious questions about transparency and delivery; it does not establish that the entire ₦100 billion disappeared.
1. The original promise: ₦100 billion for 3,000 buses
On 31 July 2023, Tinubu announced the proposed investment as part of the government's response to the economic effects of petrol subsidy removal.
Channels Television reported the president’s commitment to spend ₦100 billion on 3,000 CNG buses by March 2024.
The proposal had three central components:
- Funding: ₦100 billion.
- Quantity: 3,000 buses, each with 20-seat capacity.
- Deadline: acquisition between July 2023 and March 2024.
The administration also said participating transport companies would be able to obtain financing at a 9 per cent annual interest rate over five years.
The announcement was significant because it created an expectation that government spending would produce tangible transport assets. The public would reasonably expect buses to be identifiable, deployed and accessible to the intended beneficiaries.
But an announcement is not a procurement contract. A budgetary provision is not necessarily a cash release. A cash release is not proof of delivery. And a photograph of buses at a government ceremony is not evidence that the entire fleet promised under a programme has been delivered.
Each stage needs its own records.
Source: Channels Television, 31 July 2023.
2. February 2024: The Senate began asking questions
By February 2024, the original programme had attracted scrutiny from the Senate Committee on Gas.
On 7 February, TheCable reported that the committee, chaired by Senator Jarigbe Jarigbe, had given Finance Minister Wale Edun seven days to provide information on the disbursement of the ₦100 billion earmarked for CNG buses.
The committee wanted details of the bidding process, the companies benefiting from the allocation, the projects they were undertaking and compliance with the Public Procurement Act.
The following day, TheCable reported that the committee argued that the government could not disburse the ₦100 billion without National Assembly approval. Senator Jarigbe said the committee had a responsibility to scrutinise public expenditure and would be failing in its duties if it ignored how government agencies spent public funds.
These reports establish that the funding and procurement arrangements were subject to parliamentary questions. They do not, by themselves, prove that the money was stolen or that no buses were purchased.
But they raise a question that should never have been difficult to answer: Where is the complete, reconciled public account of the original ₦100 billion project?
If the money was properly appropriated and spent, the government should be able to publish the relevant approval, procurement, payment and delivery records.
If the original arrangement was modified, cancelled or replaced by a different procurement programme, that should be documented too.
Source: TheCable, 7 February 2024 and TheCable, 8 February 2024.
3. The government unveiled buses — but which programme paid for them?
The public record becomes more complicated when later bus announcements are examined.
On 12 August 2024, Tinubu inaugurated 30 hybrid CNG buses assembled by Innoson Motors. According to TheCable, 20 were donated by the Depot and Petroleum Products Marketers Association of Nigeria (DAPPMAN), while NNPC donated the remaining 10.
These vehicles were real and publicly unveiled. But the report described them as donations, not as proof of delivery under the original ₦100 billion procurement.
In October 2024, the Federal Ministry of Finance announced the unveiling of 64 CNG buses to mark Nigeria’s 64th Independence Anniversary. The ministry described this as the first phase of a broader initiative intended to distribute more than 500 CNG buses and 100 electric buses to labour and student unions.
Again, these announcements demonstrate that buses were being introduced under the government's wider clean-transport agenda. They do not establish how many of the original 3,000 buses were purchased using the original ₦100 billion allocation.
This is where public communication can obscure accountability, even without proving wrongdoing.
When several programmes use similar language — CNG buses, alternative-fuel transport, subsidy relief, electric mobility and affordable transit — the public can easily be left with the impression that every unveiling represents progress against the same original commitment.
But the programmes may have different funding sources, suppliers, beneficiaries and procurement arrangements.
A donation is not the same as a government purchase. A vehicle bought through a later initiative is not automatically part of the 2023 fleet. And a bus count across multiple programmes cannot be used to certify the delivery of a particular contract.
The government needs to publish a consolidated account that distinguishes these categories.
Sources: TheCable, 12 August 2024 and Federal Ministry of Finance, October 2024.
4. A separate investigation found ₦45.9 billion in CNG conversion spending
The questions about transparency are not limited to the original bus promise.
In July 2025, PREMIUM TIMES published an investigation into the Presidential Initiative on Compressed Natural Gas. The newspaper reported that the Federal Government had spent approximately ₦45.925 billion through the Commercial Vehicle Conversion Incentive Programme, based on transactions recorded on Govspend.
The investigation identified 19 transactions involving 14 companies. It reported that the expenditure covered conversion kits and more than 500 bi-fuel buses, among other programme-related spending.
The newspaper also reported concerns involving possible black-market diversion of subsidised conversion kits, procurement opacity and a potential conflict of interest involving a programme official and a private company.
These findings deserve serious scrutiny. However, the ₦45.9 billion figure relates to the Commercial Vehicle Conversion Incentive Programme, a distinct component of the wider CNG initiative. It must not be added to, or automatically treated as expenditure from, the original ₦100 billion bus commitment without documentary evidence establishing the relationship.
The investigation also reported that the programme disclosed distributing 15,310 conversion kits from June 2024 to May 2025 in response to a Freedom of Information request, but did not provide the total procurement cost of those kits to the newspaper.
After the report was published, PREMIUM TIMES reported that a list of more than 300 conversion centres had disappeared from the initiative’s website. The agency reportedly said the website was down and would be restored.
The disappearance of a public list does not prove that the listed centres were fictitious. But removing public information after questions have been raised about a government programme makes independent verification harder.
The appropriate response would be to restore the list, disclose the approved centres and their locations, publish the relevant contracts and investigate any substantiated allegations of conflicts of interest or diversion.
Sources: PREMIUM TIMES, 5 July 2025 and PREMIUM TIMES, 16 July 2025.
5. The real audit question: Where is the original fleet?
The central issue is not whether a minister can stand beside a bus at a commissioning ceremony. It is whether the public can reconcile the original commitment with verifiable deliveries.
For the 3,000-bus promise, an adequate public audit should answer at least six questions.
First: How much was actually released?
The government should distinguish the amount announced, the amount appropriated, the amount authorised for release and the amount actually paid. These are different financial figures.
Second: Who received the money?
The names of contractors, manufacturers, intermediaries and beneficiary companies should be disclosed, together with their contract amounts and procurement methods.
Third: How many buses were purchased under the original programme?
The government should provide a complete delivery register, not a cumulative count assembled from unrelated projects. Each vehicle should have a unique identification number, manufacturer, model, delivery date and record of acceptance.
Fourth: Where are the buses now?
The register should identify each beneficiary, operating location and transport route. Where commercially sensitive information must be protected, the government should still provide enough information for independent auditors to verify the fleet.
Fifth: Are the buses operational?
A vehicle that has been delivered but remains parked because it lacks gas infrastructure, trained drivers, spare parts or maintenance support is not delivering the intended transport benefit.
Sixth: What did passengers gain?
The programme was justified partly by the promise of more affordable transportation. The government should therefore publish operating data, routes, passenger numbers, fare levels and the extent to which the buses reduced costs for users.
Without these records, Nigerians cannot reliably determine whether the programme delivered its promised output or achieved its policy objectives.
6. Why the distinction matters to taxpayers
The phrase “ghost buses” suggests vehicles that exist on paper but not in reality. That is a serious allegation, and it should be reserved for cases where evidence supports it.
The available material establishes that the original ₦100 billion commitment attracted parliamentary scrutiny and that subsequent government announcements covered multiple bus and conversion programmes. It also establishes that investigative reporting found substantial expenditure and transparency concerns within a separate CNG conversion programme.
What remains unresolved in the evidence reviewed here is a complete reconciliation of the original ₦100 billion allocation with the number of buses procured, paid for, delivered and put into service.
That gap is itself a legitimate public-interest issue. It does not require anyone to invent a theft figure or claim that no buses exist.
The public has a right to know whether a programme announced to ease the cost-of-living crisis produced the promised assets. The government has a responsibility to make that determination possible.
A transport programme can fail in several ways: money may be improperly spent; procurement may be opaque; delivery may fall short of the target; vehicles may arrive late; or buses may be delivered but poorly maintained and underused.
These failures have different causes and remedies. A proper audit is how the country determines which, if any, occurred.
7. The government should publish the documents, not just the photographs
The most useful next step is straightforward. The Federal Ministry of Finance and the Presidential Initiative on CNG and Electric Vehicles should publish a project-level reconciliation of the original 2023 commitment.
That disclosure should include:
- The original approval and applicable budget or funding authority.
- The procurement plan, tender notices, evaluation records and award decisions.
- The identity of each supplier and the amount paid.
- The number of buses ordered, paid for, delivered, accepted and deployed.
- The current location and operational status of each vehicle.
- A clear explanation of any changes to the original 3,000-bus target or March 2024 deadline.
- An independent audit of the financial and physical delivery records.
The National Assembly should also publish the findings of any oversight inquiry into the original allocation, including the ministry’s response to the Senate committee’s questions.
Where records are missing, the government should explain why. Where delivery fell short, it should disclose the shortfall and the corrective action taken. Where evidence of fraud or abuse exists, the relevant investigative authorities should act.
This is not a demand for a political favour. It is a basic standard of public financial accountability.
Conclusion: The question is bigger than a bus
Tinubu’s ₦100 billion CNG-bus promise was made in the context of a cost-of-living crisis. Its purpose was to help expand public transport and reduce the burden of fuel costs on Nigerians.
The subsequent Senate inquiry, the separate CNG conversion spending documented by PREMIUM TIMES and the overlapping announcements about bus deliveries make transparent accounting essential.
But the evidence must be handled precisely. It does not yet justify a definitive claim that the entire ₦100 billion was stolen or that all 3,000 buses were fictitious. What it does justify is a demand for a complete, independently verifiable account of the original commitment.
The test is simple: show the money, show the contracts, identify the buses, establish where they operate and disclose what passengers gained.
A government should not expect Nigerians to treat a press release as an audit or a commissioning photograph as proof of a fleet-wide delivery target.
If the ₦100 billion was properly spent and the promised buses were delivered, publish the evidence. If the programme fell short, explain the shortfall. If public money was misused, investigate it.
The Nigerian taxpayer deserves more than announcements. The taxpayer deserves an account.
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