When U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary Richard Michaels came to Lagos, the message was straightforward:
America wants its companies to prosper in Nigeria — and it wants more American companies to enter the Nigerian market.
There is nothing wrong with that ambition.
Nigeria is too large, too important and too strategically located for Washington to ignore.
The United States says Nigeria is its second-largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa, with bilateral goods and services trade reaching about $14.7 billion in 2025, up 13.3% from 2024.
But there is a problem hiding behind the celebration.
China is already much deeper into Africa's commercial and physical economy.
And that raises a difficult question for Washington:
Can America still deliver the kind of economic influence it is promising Nigeria when China's industrial footprint has become so large?
The answer depends on what we mean by influence.
America still has extraordinary financial, technological and military power.
But if the competition is about who builds roads, railways, ports, factories, telecom networks, power infrastructure, batteries, solar systems and industrial supply chains, China's position is considerably stronger than the American diplomatic language sometimes suggests.
The numbers tell the story
The U.S. government's own figures show that American-Nigerian trade has improved.
U.S. goods and services trade with Nigeria was approximately $14.7 billion in 2025.
But look at the composition.
U.S. goods exports to Nigeria reached $6.8 billion, while Nigerian goods exports to America were $5.0 billion.
The United States therefore ran a $1.8 billion goods surplus with Nigeria in 2025.
America also recorded a $1.7 billion services surplus.
That is meaningful.
But trade is only one measure of economic power.
The bigger question is:
Who is embedded in Nigeria's physical economy?
And here the Chinese presence becomes difficult to ignore.
China has been building the infrastructure
China is not merely selling Nigeria products.
Chinese companies have participated in major Nigerian infrastructure projects involving:
railways,
roads,
power,
airports,
free-trade zones,
telecommunications,
ports,
and industrial facilities.
Chinese-backed projects include the Abuja-Kaduna railway, Lagos-Ibadan railway, airport terminals, Lekki Deep Sea Port and Zungeru Hydropower Station.
In January 2025, China Development Bank released $254.76 million for the Kaduna-Kano railway.
The $973 million railway is being constructed by China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation and forms part of the broader Belt and Road framework.
Then in May 2025, Nigeria approved another $652 million China Exim Bank financing package for a road connecting the Lekki Deep Sea Port and Dangote refinery corridor with southern Nigeria.
China is also Nigeria's largest bilateral creditor, with Nigerian debt to China exceeding $5 billion at the time of that report.
This is the difference between selling to Nigeria and helping build Nigeria's infrastructure.
China did not suddenly replace America
The shift has been happening for decades.
In 2000, China-Africa trade was only about $10 billion.
By 2008 it had reached roughly $100 billion.
By 2015 it had doubled again to around $200 billion.
In 2023, two-way China-Africa trade exceeded $282 billion.
China has been Africa's largest trading partner since 2008.
By 2024, China-Africa trade reached a record approximately $295.6 billion according to Chinese official figures.
The China Africa Research Initiative's UN-based data puts 2024 trade at about $278 billion, illustrating an important methodological difference between datasets, but both show the same enormous scale of the relationship.
Compare that with U.S.-Africa trade.
CSIS puts total U.S.-Africa trade in 2024 at about $104.9 billion, compared with approximately $295 billion between China and Africa.
That is not a small gap.
It is roughly a three-to-one difference.
And that gap was not created overnight.
China understood something America didn't prioritize
China approached Africa differently.
Washington frequently approaches Africa through:
security,
democracy,
governance,
human rights,
development assistance,
trade preferences,
and increasingly critical minerals.
Beijing has generally placed much more emphasis on:
infrastructure,
manufacturing,
construction,
telecommunications,
energy,
trade,
industrial parks,
transportation,
and financing.
Neither model is purely altruistic.
China wants resources, markets, contracts, political relationships and strategic influence.
America wants markets, investment opportunities, strategic partnerships and access to critical minerals.
Countries pursue interests.
But there is an important difference.
China often arrives with something physical to build.
And developing countries notice that.
This is where the American promise becomes difficult
Michaels' message is essentially:
We want American companies already operating in Nigeria to succeed, and we want more American companies to come.
Good.
But American companies need more than diplomatic encouragement.
They need:
reliable electricity,
roads,
ports,
rail,
telecommunications,
finance,
industrial suppliers,
predictable regulation,
skilled workers,
and a large enough market.
And this creates a paradox.
China has spent decades helping build parts of precisely that physical ecosystem.
America is now saying:
Bring more American companies.
But China has already been helping build the environment in which companies operate.
That doesn't make Chinese companies automatically better.
It means China has accumulated industrial presence.
America's historical advantage is changing
The United States emerged from the Second World War in an extraordinary position.
In 1945, America possessed enormous industrial capacity while much of Europe and Asia were devastated.
The dollar became central to the postwar financial system.
American companies expanded globally.
The U.S. military established a worldwide network of alliances and bases.
American universities and research institutions became magnets for global talent.
Hollywood, music, consumer brands and later Silicon Valley projected American cultural and technological influence.
For much of the second half of the twentieth century, American power was difficult to separate from global economic power.
But that position was never guaranteed forever.
Japan recovered.
Europe integrated.
South Korea industrialized.
China transformed itself.
India grew.
And global production became increasingly distributed.
The result is not that America became poor.
It is that America became less economically dominant relative to the rest of the world.
That distinction matters.
America is still extremely powerful
The “declining empire” argument becomes misleading if it implies that the United States is collapsing.
It isn't.
The IMF projects U.S. nominal GDP at roughly $32.4 trillion in 2026.
The country remains the world's largest economy at market exchange rates and retains enormous advantages in finance, technology, research, aerospace, advanced semiconductors and global capital markets.
The dollar remains overwhelmingly dominant in international reserves.
It accounted for about 58% of disclosed global foreign-exchange reserves in 2024, compared with about 2.2% for the renminbi.
So the story isn't:
America is finished.
It is:
America's relative monopoly over global economic power has weakened.
And China is one of the principal beneficiaries.
China's rise is extraordinary
China's transformation is one of the largest economic changes in modern history.
It went from a relatively poor, largely agrarian economy to the world's second-largest economy and the largest manufacturing powerhouse.
Its 2026 GDP at purchasing-power parity is projected at nearly 20% of global output, compared with roughly 14.5% for the United States on the same measure.
China also dominates enormous parts of the physical technology economy.
Solar panels.
Batteries.
Electric vehicles.
Telecommunications equipment.
Consumer electronics.
Machinery.
Steel.
Shipbuilding.
Rare-earth processing.
That matters enormously for Africa.
Because Africa is not only looking for financial capital.
It is looking for infrastructure and technology that can be deployed at scale.
China is now selling the infrastructure of the future
Consider energy.
Africa desperately needs electricity.
China has become a major supplier of:
solar panels,
batteries,
inverters,
transmission equipment,
electric vehicles,
and other clean-energy technologies.
In 2024, Chinese exports of low-carbon technologies to Africa reached about $9.8 billion, according to Boston University's Global Development Policy Center.
This creates an interesting form of influence.
If an African country builds its electricity system around Chinese equipment, Chinese technology becomes embedded in its economy for years.
The same is true for:
telecom networks,
rail systems,
ports,
industrial equipment,
electric buses,
vehicles,
and manufacturing machinery.
Influence becomes infrastructure.
Nigeria is a perfect example
Look around Lagos.
The Lekki Deep Sea Port.
The Dangote industrial complex.
The Lagos-Ibadan railway.
The broader industrial corridor.
Chinese construction companies.
Chinese equipment.
Chinese financing.
Chinese manufacturing.
This is not theoretical geopolitics.
It is physical.
And physical infrastructure lasts.
A diplomatic speech lasts an hour.
A railway can last fifty years.
A port can last generations.
But China has weaknesses too
This is important.
China's rise should not be romanticized.
Chinese lending to Africa has fallen dramatically from its Belt and Road peak.
Boston University data show Chinese lending to Africa fell to around $2.1 billion in 2024, compared with a peak of $28.8 billion in 2016.
China learned that enormous infrastructure lending carries enormous risks.
Some African borrowers experienced debt distress.
Some projects struggled financially.
Beijing is now becoming more selective.
Instead of simply writing giant infrastructure cheques, China is increasingly emphasizing commercially viable projects, Chinese foreign direct investment, yuan financing and smaller transactions.
So China's model is evolving.
It is not unlimited money.
It is increasingly strategic commercial engagement.
And that creates an opening for America
America does not have to beat China by copying China.
It has other advantages.
American companies remain extraordinarily strong in:
technology,
software,
AI,
aerospace,
healthcare,
financial services,
entertainment,
professional services,
advanced manufacturing,
and venture capital.
The United States can offer Nigeria things China cannot easily replicate.
But Washington has to show up.
Not only when there is a security crisis.
Not only when Nigeria has critical minerals.
Not only when Washington needs diplomatic support.
Not only when another country is gaining influence.
Show up when Nigeria is building its economy.
The critical-minerals question exposes the problem
In September 2026, Nigeria and the United States signed a minerals investment framework aimed at encouraging American investment in Nigeria's estimated mineral resources.
This is strategically understandable.
America wants alternative sources of critical minerals.
Nigeria wants capital, technology and value-added processing.
That can benefit both countries.
But Nigeria should ask a simple question:
Are we going to export rocks to America, or are we going to build an industry in Nigeria?
That distinction will determine whether American investment creates Nigerian industrial capacity or merely creates another commodity-export relationship.
The same question should be asked of China.
And Europe.
And everybody else.
Nigeria should not choose America over China
This is perhaps the most important point.
Nigeria does not need to become America's client.
Nor China's client.
The smartest strategy is to make America and China compete for Nigerian value creation.
If America wants Nigerian minerals, Nigeria should demand processing.
If China wants Nigerian markets, Nigeria should demand manufacturing.
If America wants technology contracts, Nigeria should demand skills transfer.
If China wants infrastructure contracts, Nigeria should demand local supply chains.
If Europe wants access to Nigerian markets, Europe should bring investment.
The objective should not be:
Which foreign power wins Nigeria?
It should be:
What does Nigeria gain from their competition?
The danger is becoming a customer
This is where history matters.
Nigeria can have $15 billion of trade with America.
It can have $20 billion with China.
It can receive Chinese loans.
It can receive American investment.
It can sign mineral agreements with Washington.
It can sign infrastructure agreements with Beijing.
And still remain economically dependent.
Why?
Because trade is not the same thing as productive capacity.
If Nigeria exports crude oil and imports manufactured products, it remains vulnerable.
If Nigeria exports minerals and imports batteries, it remains vulnerable.
If Nigeria imports technology but never develops domestic capability, it remains vulnerable.
If Nigeria borrows money to build infrastructure but never develops industries that generate enough value to maintain it, it remains vulnerable.
The nationality of the supplier does not solve that problem.
This is why China is gaining ground
China's greatest advantage in Africa may not be diplomacy.
It may be commercial patience.
China spent decades building trade relationships.
It built infrastructure.
It financed projects.
It sent construction companies.
It established manufacturing operations.
It developed telecommunications networks.
It created supply chains.
It expanded its exports.
And it kept coming back.
The result is visible in the numbers.
From approximately $10 billion in China-Africa trade in 2000 to around $295 billion in 2024 is an extraordinary transformation.
America has not disappeared from Africa.
But China's economic footprint has expanded much faster.
The American empire argument needs a historical correction
There is a seductive narrative that every great power follows a simple cycle:
rise → dominance → decline → replacement.
History is rarely that neat.
Britain declined relative to the United States without disappearing.
The United States can lose relative economic share without losing global leadership.
China can become more powerful without becoming an American-style global hegemon.
The world may not be moving from:
American empire → Chinese empire.
It may instead be moving toward:
a more competitive, multipolar economic system.
That is a much more useful way to understand what is happening.
But relative decline has consequences
Even if America remains the world's most powerful state in several dimensions, relative decline matters.
When your competitors become larger, richer and more industrially capable, your ability to dictate terms decreases.
That is already visible in Africa.
China has become Africa's largest trading partner.
The United States remains important.
Europe remains important.
India, Turkey, Gulf states and others are expanding their roles.
Africa itself is increasingly trying to diversify partnerships.
That is not necessarily bad news for America.
It can be good news for African countries.
Because competition creates bargaining power.
Nigeria should exploit that competition
The biggest mistake would be to interpret American interest as charity.
It isn't.
And Chinese interest isn't charity either.
Both countries are pursuing national interests.
America wants markets.
China wants markets.
America wants critical minerals.
China wants resources.
America wants strategic partnerships.
China wants strategic partnerships.
America wants companies to succeed in Nigeria.
China wants Chinese companies to succeed in Nigeria.
That is normal international politics.
Nigeria should respond accordingly.
With negotiation, not gratitude.
America still has something China cannot easily buy
There is one enormous American advantage that shouldn't be underestimated:
the global financial and technological ecosystem surrounding the United States.
The dollar remains dominant.
American capital markets remain extraordinarily deep.
American technology companies remain globally influential.
American universities remain powerful research institutions.
The U.S. retains an enormous network of allies and strategic partnerships.
China has not replaced all of that.
And the renminbi remains far behind the dollar in global reserves.
So saying “China has replaced America” would be premature.
But saying China is replacing America in important parts of Africa's commercial and industrial ecosystem is much more defensible.
The Lagos message should therefore be read carefully
“We want more American companies in Nigeria.”
Fine.
Nigeria should welcome them.
But the question is not how many American companies enter Nigeria.
Nor how many Chinese companies enter Nigeria.
The question is:
What do those companies leave behind?
Factories?
Skills?
Technology?
Research centres?
Local suppliers?
Export industries?
Intellectual property?
Tax revenue?
Infrastructure?
Competitive Nigerian companies?
Or simply another market from which foreign companies extract profits?
That is the question Nigerian policymakers should be asking.
The next chapter should not be American or Chinese
Nigeria has spent decades being told that development requires foreign capital.
Foreign companies.
Foreign technology.
Foreign expertise.
There is truth in that.
But there is another step.
Foreign capital should help create domestic capability.
Otherwise Nigeria will remain a giant market rather than becoming a major industrial economy.
And that is the real lesson from America's relative decline and China's rise.
China did not become powerful because Africans suddenly preferred China.
China became powerful because it built an industrial machine capable of producing things the world wanted at enormous scale.
America still possesses extraordinary technological and financial power.
But if Washington wants American companies to prosper in Nigeria, diplomatic speeches will not be enough.
America will have to compete with China where China has become strongest:
investment, infrastructure, manufacturing, technology transfer, financing and long-term commercial presence.
And Nigeria should welcome that competition.
Not because America is finished.
Not because China is destined to rule.
But because Nigeria should never again depend on one foreign power to determine its economic future.
The most important question coming out of Michaels' Lagos visit is therefore not:
“Can American companies return to Nigeria?”
They can.
The question is:
“Can America offer Nigeria enough economic value to compete with a China that has already spent two decades building the relationship?”
That is the real contest.
And Nigeria should make both sides prove themselves.
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