Nigeria’s worsening security crisis has revived an old argument: should the country create state police, or should it strengthen the existing Nigeria Police Force and rebuild specialised units such as the Mobile Police Force (MOPOL)?
My position is straightforward: Nigeria should be extremely cautious about creating 36 separate state police forces. The more urgent priority is to reform, equip and reposition the existing federal police architecture—particularly the Mobile Police Force—into a professional, highly mobile national security-response capability.
This is not an argument against community policing. It is an argument against confusing local policing with fragmenting police command.
Nigeria is not facing one uniform security problem. It is facing terrorism, kidnapping, banditry, communal violence, organised crime, separatist violence, oil theft and violent protests across a country of enormous geographic and political complexity. A fragmented policing structure could create another layer of institutional rivalry when what Nigeria needs most is coordination.
The current federal police is already overstretched. Reporting has put the police-to-population ratio at roughly one officer to 600 citizens, while large numbers of officers have historically been diverted to VIP protection and other duties.
That is the problem to solve.
MOPOL already provides the foundation
The Police Mobile Force was created precisely because conventional policing sometimes cannot handle major disturbances and high-risk operations. The Nigeria Police Force describes its tactical and operational units as specially trained and equipped formations intended for violent crime, terrorism and other high-risk security duties.
Instead of building an entirely new policing structure in every state, Nigeria could take that existing capability and transform it.
Imagine a properly funded national MOPOL structure equipped with:
- modern communications;
- armoured mobility;
- drones and counter-drone capability;
- forensic and intelligence support;
- rapid-response helicopters;
- night-operations capability;
- modern firearms training;
- hostage-rescue expertise;
- counter-kidnapping units;
- advanced surveillance;
- rural patrol capability; and
- permanent professional training and certification.
That would give Nigeria something it desperately needs: a force that can move rapidly across state boundaries when criminals do the same.
Criminal networks do not respect state boundaries.
Why should Nigeria's security response be constrained by them?
The biggest problem with state police is political control
The strongest argument for state police is also its greatest vulnerability.
A governor understands his state better than officials sitting in Abuja. Local police could potentially respond faster and develop better community intelligence.
But who controls the state police?
That question cannot be treated as a footnote.
Nigeria already has a history of political competition, electoral violence and accusations of security institutions being used for political purposes. Giving state political structures direct control over armed police formations creates an obvious risk of selective enforcement, intimidation of political opponents and abuse during elections.
That concern is not theoretical. Analysts following Nigeria's proposed state-police reform have specifically raised concerns about governors misusing state police, unequal funding between states and inconsistent training standards.
Imagine a heavily armed police organisation whose operational leadership is effectively dependent on the political establishment controlling the state.
Now imagine 36 versions of it.
That is not automatically decentralisation.
It could become 36 different security cultures, 36 different chains of influence and 36 different standards of policing.
Nigeria needs mobility, not fragmentation
Consider kidnapping.
A kidnapping gang can operate in Kaduna, cross into Niger, move towards Zamfara and exploit forest corridors that do not correspond to administrative boundaries.
Bandits can move across multiple states.
Terrorist networks operate across borders.
Oil theft networks operate across jurisdictions.
Organised criminal networks exploit differences between law-enforcement agencies.
The appropriate response is therefore not simply more police organisations.
It is interoperable policing.
Nigeria needs intelligence that travels faster than criminals, communications systems that work across jurisdictions and specialised units that can be deployed wherever the threat emerges.
A reformed MOPOL could become precisely that national rapid-response layer.
But reviving MOPOL cannot mean reviving its worst history
This is where supporters of MOPOL must be honest.
The Mobile Police Force has historically attracted serious criticism over allegations of excessive force and human-rights abuses. Simply putting more weapons into the hands of poorly trained officers would be a disastrous reform.
The answer is therefore not:
“Bring back MOPOL.”
It should be:
“Rebuild MOPOL.”
That means modern rules of engagement, body cameras, independent complaints mechanisms, command accountability, evidence-based deployment, human-rights training and consequences for abuse.
The Nigeria Police Force itself says its institutional objective is to become professionally competent, service-driven, compliant with the rule of law and people-friendly.
The proposed revival should be measured against that standard.
What Nigeria should actually build
Nigeria could have a three-layer policing architecture without creating 36 autonomous police forces.
Layer one: Community policing
Local officers develop relationships with communities, gather intelligence, respond to ordinary crime and understand local disputes.
Layer two: State and regional conventional policing
Existing police commands handle investigations, traffic, domestic crime, public order and everyday law enforcement.
Layer three: A professional national MOPOL
This becomes the country's highly mobile tactical reserve—available for kidnapping, terrorism, banditry, hostage situations, major communal violence and other threats exceeding conventional police capacity.
That is a much more coherent model.
The money should go into capability, not bureaucracy
Nigeria does not necessarily need 36 new police headquarters, command structures, recruitment systems, training regimes and procurement pipelines.
It needs better policing.
The federal government should therefore prioritise funding for recruitment, training, accommodation, communications, vehicles, intelligence, forensic laboratories, aviation, digital systems and officer welfare.
The police itself has acknowledged that inadequate funding has historically affected training, equipment and operational efficiency.
There is also a major opportunity to use technology intelligently.
Nigeria could build a national security communications network connecting conventional police, MOPOL, intelligence agencies, emergency services and the military—while maintaining strict legal controls over surveillance and citizens' data.
State police is not the only form of decentralisation
This is perhaps the most important distinction.
Nigeria can decentralise policing operations without decentralising ultimate armed command into 36 political structures.
States can have greater influence over policing priorities.
Local governments and communities can provide structured intelligence.
Police commands can recruit officers with local knowledge.
Neighbourhood and community policing can be expanded.
But the country can still maintain a nationally coordinated tactical force capable of crossing state boundaries.
That gives Nigeria the advantage of local intelligence without necessarily creating 36 competing armed institutions.
The real reform Nigeria needs
The debate should therefore move beyond the simplistic question:
“State police or federal police?”
The better question is:
“What policing architecture gives Nigeria the fastest response, strongest intelligence, highest professionalism and greatest protection against political abuse?”
My answer is a reformed Nigeria Police Force with a rebuilt MOPOL at its centre of rapid national response, stronger community policing at the local level and independent oversight above it.
Nigeria does not need to multiply police forces merely because insecurity has multiplied.
It needs to make the police force it already has professional enough, mobile enough, technologically capable enough and accountable enough to defeat the criminals it is supposed to protect citizens from.
The proposed MOPOL revival is therefore worth supporting—but only if “revival” means transformation, not nostalgia.
And if Nigeria eventually proceeds with state police, the safeguards must be exceptionally strong.
Because the country should never solve the problem of an overstretched police force by creating 36 potentially politicised versions of the same problem.
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